{"dataType": "CVE_RECORD", "dataVersion": "5.2", "cveMetadata": {"cveId": "CVE-2026-65626", "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "state": "PUBLISHED", "assignerShortName": "EEF", "dateReserved": "2026-07-22T13:55:59.401Z", "datePublished": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z"}, "containers": {"cna": {"affected": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["jose_jwa_pkcs1"], "packageName": "jose", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose", "product": "jose", "programFiles": ["src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "vendor": "potatosalad", "versions": [{"lessThan": "1.11.13", "status": "affected", "version": "1.3.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["jose_jwa_pkcs1"], "packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose", "packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "product": "jose", "programFiles": ["src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "vendor": "potatosalad", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d", "status": "affected", "version": "853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8", "versionType": "git"}]}], "configurations": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code> module) instead of the native OTP <code>public_key</code> implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (<code>application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)</code>, or <code>JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)</code> in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code>.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module) instead of the native OTP `public_key` implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (`application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)`, or `JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)` in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through `jose_jwa_pkcs1`."}], "value": "The vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module) instead of the native OTP public_key implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true), or JOSE.crypto_fallback(true) in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through jose_jwa_pkcs1."}], "cpeApplicability": [{"nodes": [{"cpeMatch": [{"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*", "versionEndExcluding": "1.11.13", "versionStartIncluding": "1.3.0", "vulnerable": true}], "negate": false, "operator": "OR"}], "operator": "AND"}], "credits": [{"lang": "en", "type": "reporter", "value": "Peter Ullrich"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "remediation developer", "value": "Andrew Bennett"}, {"lang": "en", "type": "analyst", "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"}], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "supportingMedia": [{"base64": false, "type": "text/html", "value": "<p>The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the <code>jose_jwa_pkcs1</code> module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. <code>eme_pkcs1_decode/2</code> returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid <code>PKCS#1</code> v1.5 padding (a leading <code>0x00 0x02</code>, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a <code>0x00</code> separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and <code>rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2</code> additionally returns <code>{error, {badsize, _}}</code> when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in <code>dp/2</code> is a raw, non-blinded <code>crypto:mod_pow/3</code>, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.</p>\n<p>An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls <code>decrypt_private/3</code> with <code>rsa_pkcs1_padding</code>) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.</p>\n<p>This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.</p>"}, {"base64": false, "type": "text/markdown", "value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. `eme_pkcs1_decode/2` returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid `PKCS#1` v1.5 padding (a leading `0x00 0x02`, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a `0x00` separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and `rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2` additionally returns `{error, {badsize, _}}` when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in `dp/2` is a raw, non-blinded `crypto:mod_pow/3`, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls `decrypt_private/3` with `rsa_pkcs1_padding`) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."}], "value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."}], "impacts": [{"capecId": "CAPEC-463", "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CAPEC-463 Padding Oracle Crypto Attack"}]}], "metrics": [{"cvssV4_0": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "baseScore": 5.9, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "format": "CVSS", "scenarios": [{"lang": "en", "value": "GENERAL"}]}], "problemTypes": [{"descriptions": [{"cweId": "CWE-203", "description": "CWE-203 Observable Discrepancy", "lang": "en", "type": "CWE"}]}], "providerMetadata": {"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "shortName": "EEF", "dateUpdated": "2026-10-26T19:53:05.620Z"}, "references": [{"tags": ["vendor-advisory", "related"], "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"}, {"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-65626", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"}, {"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-65626", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"}, {"name": "Introducing commit 853c5d4 in potatosalad/erlang-jose", "tags": ["related"], "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"}, {"name": "Fix commit 0eac8ce in potatosalad/erlang-jose", "tags": ["patch"], "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"}], "source": {"discovery": "EXTERNAL"}, "title": "Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose"}}}

{}

{"affected": [{"affectedData": [{"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["jose_jwa_pkcs1"], "packageName": "jose", "packageURL": "pkg:hex/jose", "product": "jose", "programFiles": ["src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "vendor": "potatosalad", "versions": [{"lessThan": "1.11.13", "status": "affected", "version": "1.3.0", "versionType": "semver"}]}, {"collectionURL": "https://github.com", "cpes": ["cpe:2.3:a:potatosalad:jose:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"], "defaultStatus": "unaffected", "modules": ["jose_jwa_pkcs1"], "packageName": "potatosalad/erlang-jose", "packageURL": "pkg:github/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "product": "jose", "programFiles": ["src/jwa/jose_jwa_pkcs1.erl"], "programRoutines": [{"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:decrypt_private/3"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:eme_pkcs1_decode/2"}, {"name": "jose_jwa_pkcs1:dp/2"}], "repo": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose", "vendor": "potatosalad", "versions": [{"lessThan": "0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d", "status": "affected", "version": "853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8", "versionType": "git"}]}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"}], "cveTags": [], "descriptions": [{"lang": "en", "value": "The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 \u00a77.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13."}], "id": "CVE-2026-65626", "lastModified": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.103", "metrics": {"cvssMetricV40": [{"cvssData": {"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED", "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED", "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackRequirements": "PRESENT", "attackVector": "LOCAL", "availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "baseScore": 5.9, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED", "integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED", "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE", "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "userInteraction": "NONE", "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED", "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X", "version": "4.0", "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE", "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE", "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"}, "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}, "published": "2026-10-26T20:17:58.103", "references": [{"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j"}, {"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626"}], "sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "vulnStatus": "Received", "weaknesses": [{"description": [{"lang": "en", "value": "CWE-203"}], "source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db", "type": "Secondary"}]}

{}

{}