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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90399 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kzalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_params)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath12k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90398 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse() Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the allocation. The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match that stride. Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides. Compile tested only. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90358 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, x86: Fix trampoline stack size for 128-bit arguments btf_distill_func_proto() accepts a function argument up to 16 bytes, so a 128-bit scalar such as __int128 reaches the x86 trampoline with arg_size == 16. But the current implementation assumes an __int128 argument only needs one register, so the register save area is under-allocated and save_args() overwrites adjacent stack slots. Compute the register count from arg_size for all arguments to fix it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90322 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/cluster: keep heartbeat local node stable o2nm_node_local_store() handles local=0 by stopping o2net and setting cl_local_node to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM, but it leaves cl_has_local set. That stale state makes o2nm_this_node() return 255, blocks a later local=1 attempt with -EBUSY, and can feed 255 to heartbeat users that call o2nm_this_node() dynamically. Clearing cl_has_local is required when the local node is reset. But heartbeat threads can still be running at that point. They pin the local node config item at startup, yet o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat() and thread teardown re-read o2nm_this_node() for the local slot and for o2nm_undepend_this_node(). Once local=0 has cleared the live local-node state, those dynamic reads return O2NM_MAX_NODES, which is also the invalid node number 255. Store the local node number in the heartbeat region when the region starts. Use that stable node for heartbeat slot writes/checks, negotiation messages, and the final configfs undepend. Stop the heartbeat loop when the current local node no longer matches the stored node, and clear cl_has_local together with cl_local_node in the local=0 path so nodemanager state matches node removal. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20 Read of size 8 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xd0/0x630 o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x5/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079) o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770 kthread_affine_node+0x139/0x180 lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190 trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 kthread+0x19d/0x1e0 ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x4d0 __switch_to+0x2d5/0x6f0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90320 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block. Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an entry-bounds check. Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks, and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first bucket block while checking name/value offsets against the bucket block they target. Reject corrupted external xattr metadata before listxattr() or getxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or name/value offsets. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a654007 by task ocfs2_xattr_lis/630 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190 ocfs2_listxattr+0x3f6/0x610 listxattr+0x90/0xe0 path_listxattrat+0xed/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | ||||
| CVE-2026-90259 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data() In that function, we round down the start position and round up the ending position. But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len, sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up length. Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using "start + len", which is completely incorrect. Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90205 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read". OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes. A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is reported. Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing. Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode validation boundary. This patch (of 2): [BUG] A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range. ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85 Call Trace: ... ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102 ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840 ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295 evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810 iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline] iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline] iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926 ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374 ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373 ... [CAUSE] ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots. [FIX] Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90174 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user() ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC login response with user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz; user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP); if (user->passkey) memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz); resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy() reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack hash[] buffer before allocating and copying. [ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611 [ 2030.242296] [ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ 2030.242763] Call Trace: [ 2030.242769] <TASK> [ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0 [ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200 [ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70 [ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150 [ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0 [ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 [ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680 [ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120 [ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00 [ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0 [ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140 [ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0 [ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300 [ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0 [ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280 [ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490 [ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490 [ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300 [ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110 [ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20 [ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470 [ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910 [ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0 [ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 2030.243564] </TASK> [ 2030.243570] [ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279: [ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 [ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0 [ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750 [ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340 [ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0 [ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0 [ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40 [ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930 [ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00 [ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140 [ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470 [ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100 [ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460 [ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 2030.305594] [ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640 [ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192 [ 2030.309595] The buggy address ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-90142 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_net: Fix resize of the RX ring When a AF_XDP socket is attached, the virtnet_rx_resize should resize the rq->xsk_buffs XSK buffer array. Otherwise, when the size grows, the virtnet_rx_resume() causes a write past the end of the array. This is easily reproducable with ethtool -G ens3 rx 32 ./xdpsock -i eth0 -q 0 -r -z & ethtool -G eth0 rx 256 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90112 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: qlcnic: validate unified ROM sections before loading The unified ROM parser reads directory, product, and data-descriptor fields from the firmware file. Existing validation forms table and data ends with unchecked additions and multiplications. Malformed values can wrap before they are compared with the firmware size. The parser also dereferences typed pointers at firmware-controlled offsets. Valid descriptor extents alone are insufficient for the consumers. The loader reads a fixed-size bootloader regardless of its declared size, the version parser assumes a 17-byte tail, and a partial final firmware word is read as a full u64. A truncated image can therefore make the driver read beyond the firmware allocation during validation or loading. Replace the pointer-returning parser with bounded range helpers. Validate table entry sizes, descriptor indices, section ranges, the fixed bootloader load length, and the version tail before exposing any section. Read all file fields with unaligned little-endian accessors and assemble a partial final word from only the bytes that remain. Apply the same range checks to the legacy image before reading its fixed fields. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90109 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit: sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ) gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ) sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo) sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug) sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32. Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel can be driven to OOM. Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and the stored u32 backlog never wraps. The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup): attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB, leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len, or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32, admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90083 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight. IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types, simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header. Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or without IFE. That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this patch: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000 data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657) tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522) tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328) tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728) With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of hard_header_len. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90076 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before multiplying so the product cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 << 20, matching the bound already enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change(). Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89906 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: BPF: Refactor jump offset calculation in tail call The old macro-based jmp_offset calculation derives the jump distance from a stale prior-pass code stride, which can lead to wrong branch offsets and soft lockups under extra JIT passes. Fix this by calculating the offset directly on the absolute target: "ctx->offset[insn + 1] - ctx->idx". To avoid a false 16-bit range check abort during size estimation, add a "ctx->image == NULL" guard to inject a safe dummy offset. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89840 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: validate MOVE_RANGE destination size F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE checks the source range, but not the destination end before updating i_size. A source hole can expose this: __clone_blkaddrs() skips NULL_ADDR entries and returns success, so the caller can still extend the destination inode with unchecked pos_out + len. Reject destination overflow and use inode_newsize_ok() before extending the destination inode. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89838 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: limit recovery filename logging to stored length F2FS stores recovery filenames as a length plus a fixed-size i_name buffer. The buffer is not NUL-terminated, but recover_inode() and recover_dentry() print it with %s. For a 255-byte filename, recovery logging can read past i_name into the following raw inode fields. Print the name with a precision bounded by i_namelen and F2FS_NAME_LEN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89834 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to migrate all curseg types during free_segment_range In free_segment_range(), the curseg evacuation loop only iterates up to NR_CURSEG_PERSIST_TYPE (0..5), missing non-persistent in-memory curseg types such as CURSEG_COLD_DATA_PINNED and CURSEG_ALL_DATA_ATGC. Even though these in-memory curseg types are not saved in the on-disk checkpoint header, they still occupy active physical segments at runtime. If an active in-memory curseg happens to be allocated within the segment range being truncated during filesystem shrink, failing to evacuate it will cause subsequent writes to the curseg attempting out-of-bounds I/O on the truncated storage range. Fix this by expanding the curseg evacuation loop upper bound to NR_CURSEG_TYPE to ensure all active curseg types are safely migrated out of the target range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89806 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sysfb: ofdrm: Fix integer overflow in fb_size calculation The framebuffer size calculation `fb_size = linebytes * height` can overflow when both values are large (e.g., 46341 * 46341 > INT_MAX). Since linebytes and height are both int types, the multiplication is performed as int * int, which results in undefined behavior on overflow. Use check_mul_overflow() to detect and prevent this overflow, consistent with the approach used in simpledrm.c and corebootdrm.c. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89759 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/kmemleak: avoid soft lockup when scanning task stacks Patch series "mm/kmemleak: avoid soft lockup when scanning task", v3. kmemleak_scan() scans every task stack under one rcu_read_lock() with no reschedule point, which can trip the soft lockup watchdog on hosts with very many threads. That prints the following message, depending on the workload+host configuration: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#35 stuck for 22s! [kmemleak:537] scan_block kmemleak_scan kmemleak_scan_thread kthread Patch 1 walks the tasks with find_ge_pid() so the scan reschedules between tasks Patches 2-3 let the scan loops stop early once a scan is interrupted. This patch (of 3): kmemleak_scan() walks every thread and scans its kernel stack under a single rcu_read_lock() with no reschedule point. On a host with very many threads -- amplified by KASAN/lockdep in debug builds -- this loop can hog a CPU long enough to trip the soft lockup watchdog: watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#35 stuck for 22s! [kmemleak:537] scan_block kmemleak_scan kmemleak_scan_thread kthread A cond_resched() cannot be added directly: the loop runs inside an RCU read-side critical section. Walk the tasks one PID at a time with find_ge_pid(), taking the RCU read lock only to look up and pin each task. The stack is then scanned with no lock held, so cond_resched() runs between tasks and the scan stops early on scan_should_stop(). This follows the next_tgid()/task_seq_get_next() iteration pattern and keeps each RCU critical section short. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80576 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-21 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: reject oversized IBs with per-ring packet limits On GFX rings, amdgpu_cs_p2_ib() passed user-supplied ib_bytes through to ib->length_dw without a limit, while ring_emit_ib() encodes length into packet fields. Oversized values can corrupt adjacent control bits and destabilize command submission. Add a per-ring IB packet size limit helper and reject command submissions exceeding the corresponding dword limit before IB allocation. Use the documented 20-bit limit for GFX/compute/SDMA/VPE, and apply the MM fallback limit for other ring types. (cherry picked from commit 7f48fa2cf62e3fa6c9c3870aa74988f773247e52) | ||||