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Search Results (414020 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-79980 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-10-23 | 5.6 Medium |
| The DHCPv4 client in subsys/net/lib/dhcpv4/dhcpv4.c maintained its transaction identifier (iface->config.dhcpv4.xid) as a counter rather than as a per-transaction random value. It was seeded once with sys_rand32_get() in dhcpv4_start_internal(), incremented by one in dhcpv4_send_discover() and dhcpv4_send_decline(), and never changed by dhcpv4_send_request() — so every RENEWING and REBINDING exchange reused, unchanged, the identifier that had already appeared on the wire in the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER at boot, and where the identifier did move it moved predictably by one. RFC 2131 4.1 requires a single identifier per transaction, chosen so that clients are unlikely to collide. This identifier is the client's only unpredictable reply-validation token. net_dhcpv4_input() accepts a BOOTP reply on op, a matching xid, and a matching chaddr (the interface MAC, which is public); the UDP callback is registered with a wildcard remote address and port, and no server-identifier or source-address check is applied. An attacker who learns one identifier — for example any host on the same segment that sees the broadcast DHCPDISCOVER, or a DHCP server or relay on a network the device previously joined — therefore retains a valid token for the device's whole uptime, and can predict the identifiers of later exchanges, without having to observe the unicast renew traffic or race the legitimate server. A forged reply that passes those checks has effect regardless of client state, because dhcpv4_parse_options() applies its side effects before the state machine gate in dhcpv4_handle_reply(): the router option calls net_if_ipv4_set_gw() and the DNS option calls dns_resolve_reconfigure(). A single accepted datagram can thus repoint the device's default gateway and resolvers at attacker-controlled addresses, redirecting its traffic; during RENEWING or REBINDING a forged DHCPACK re-binds the lease with attacker-chosen parameters and a forged DHCPNAK removes the address and restarts configuration. The fix draws a fresh sys_rand32_get() value at each point where a transaction begins — entering SELECTING, RENEWING and REBINDING, and at the INIT/INIT-REBOOT entry taken when an interface with a lease goes down — while REQUESTING and DECLINE keep the identifier of the exchange they belong to, as RFC 2131 requires. As a side effect the client also no longer discards a slow server's offer after retransmitting a discover, and the initial-discover backoff now draws its own randomness instead of deriving it from the identifier. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79981 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-10-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| The DNS stub resolver in subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c binds one UDP socket per configured server when the resolver context is initialised (dns_resolve_init_locked() -> register_dispatcher() -> dns_dispatcher_register()), with the local port left at 0 so the stack picks an ephemeral port exactly once. dns_write() then sends every subsequent query from that same socket without re-binding, so the source port is constant for the lifetime of the resolver context while only the 16-bit transaction identifier (ctx->queries[i].id, drawn with sys_rand16_get()) varies per query. RFC 5452 section 9.2 requires both to vary; with a fixed port, an off-path attacker has to guess only the identifier. The stable port is cheap to learn. Any single observed query reveals it permanently, and it can also be found by probing the ephemeral UDP range: subsys/net/ip/connection.c answers unmatched unicast UDP with an ICMP port-unreachable, so the resolver's socket is the one port in that range that stays silent. Acceptance of a reply is decided solely by get_slot_by_id() matching the transaction identifier and a CRC-16 of the queried name — the reply's source address is never checked (dispatcher_cb() does ARG_UNUSED(addr)), so forged answers need not even be spoofed to appear to come from the configured server; they only need to reach the resolver's port. An attacker with UDP reachability to the device (same LAN, Wi-Fi or mesh segment, or a globally routable device address) can therefore flood answers for a predictable query name across the 16-bit identifier space during a query window and race the legitimate server. A win makes the application resolve an attacker-chosen address, and with CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_CACHE enabled the forged record is retained for its attacker-chosen TTL. The attack still requires winning that race, and applications that validate TLS certificates for the resolved endpoint are largely protected. The fix draws a fresh local port before each query to a server that has nothing outstanding: dns_randomize_source_port() unregisters the dispatcher, closes and reopens the socket, and re-registers it bound to port 0 so the system selects a new port, raising the per-query guessing space from roughly 16 to roughly 31 bits. Multicast DNS and LLMNR are excluded because their ports are protocol-fixed. The behaviour is controlled by CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER_RANDOMIZE_SOURCE_PORT (default y). | ||||
| CVE-2026-79859 | 2026-10-23 | 9.8 Critical | ||
| Buffer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the affected interface of AOS-8 that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code as a privileged user on the underlying operating system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79864 | 1 Hpe | 1 Aos | 2026-10-23 | 9.6 Critical |
| Command injection vulnerabilities exist in the affected interface of AOS-10 that could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to perform command injection. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands as a privileged user on the underlying operating system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46347 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 6.8 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, when a password reset link is visited, the application generates a replacement password in a predictable way and emails it to the account holder. The insufficient entropy allows the password to be brute-forced by an attacker who can approximate the server-side generation time. Exploiting this finding in isolation requires the victim to have triggered the reset themselves and the attacker to infer the server time from network or email metadata. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46651 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 9.8 Critical |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 24.03 to before version 26.05, the DownloadTaskEndpoint WebSocket endpoint (/tasks/download/monitor.socket) in goobi-viewer-core accepts download requests from unauthenticated users. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46652 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 9.8 Critical |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 24.03 to before version 26.05, ExternalFilesDownloader.getFilename() extracts the destination filename from a server-supplied Content-Disposition response header and passes it directly to Path.resolve() without stripping directory components. This allows for a malicious HTTP server that the viewer fetches from to supply an absolute path or ../ traversal sequences as the filename, writing attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary path writable by the Tomcat process. When targeting the deployed web-application directory, this yields remote code execution as the tomcat OS user. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55444 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, the legacy RSS servlet (RssResolver, GET /rss/) accepts the q and filterQuery parameters and concatenates them into Solr queries without validation. The servlet predates the REST API layer and lacks the input validation present in GET /api/v1/records/rss. q forms the main query body (wrapped only in literal parentheses); filterQuery is passed directly as a Solr fq. An unauthenticated attacker can inject Solr boolean operators to break out of the wrapping and render the trailing access-condition filter-query suffix optional, so that access-restricted records are included in the generated RSS feed. The q and filterQuery parameters are the same underlying vulnerability in the same servlet; q (the main query body) has the broader scope. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55457 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 7.4 High |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. Prior to version 26.05, Configuration.getWebApiToken returns the empty string when webapi.authorization.token is not configured. AuthorizationFilter compares the supplied token against this default without first checking that the configured token is non-empty. A request to any @AuthorizationBinding-protected endpoint with an empty ?token= value is therefore accepted. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-112333 | 2 Gfi, Gfi Software | 2 Gfi Archiver, Gfi Archiver | 2026-10-23 | 5.4 Medium |
| GFI Archiver before 15.14 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the MailInsights scheduled report configuration that allows authenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the report name parameter to /Archiver/MailInsights.aspx. The injected payload is stored by ReportScheduling.btnSaveReport_Click() without output encoding and is executed in the browser of the user who created the scheduled report when they subsequently view the MailInsights page. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55463 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 6.5 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 4.11.0 to before version 26.05, several Jakarta WebSocket endpoints in goobi-viewer-core (DownloadTaskEndpoint, CampaignEndpoint, AutocompleteEndpoint, UserEndpoint) accept connections without verifying that the associated HttpSession belongs to a logged-in user, and none validate the Origin header against an allowlist. An unauthenticated attacker can therefore connect to these endpoints; through CampaignEndpoint this allows polluting the in-process crowdsourcing page-lock map and broadcasting forged lock messages, disrupting reviewers' work. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55465 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 22.04 to before version 26.05, the unauthenticated REST endpoint GET /api/v1/index/{solrField}/spatial/search concatenates the user-supplied region query parameter directly into a Solr query string with no escaping, no local-param stripping, and no runtime schema enforcement (the OpenAPI @Schema(pattern=...) annotation is documentation-only at the JAX-RS layer). An attacker can inject Solr local-param syntax ({!parent ...}, {!join ...}) and boolean operators to make access-restricted georeferenced records match the query, bypassing the access-condition filter. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55486 | 1 Intranda | 1 Goobi Viewer Core | 2026-10-23 | 9.3 Critical |
| The Goobi viewer is a web application that allows digitised material to be displayed in a web browser. From version 25.08 to before version 26.05, the IIIF Auth 2.0 endpoints auth/login and auth/token in AuthorizationFlowResource accept an origin query parameter without validation and then (1) embed it into the Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors response header and (2) embed it into an HTML response body as a JavaScript single-quoted postMessage argument. Because the attacker controls both the login and token calls that initiate the flow, the unescaped value yields reflected XSS. This issue has been patched in version 26.05. | ||||
| CVE-2026-55222 | 1 Ilbers | 1 Isar | 2026-10-23 | 5.1 Medium |
| Isar is an integration system for automated root filesystem generation. In versions 0.11 and newer, /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d is created manually during bootstrap setup to be able to deploy local keys. By that, the directory is owned by the calling user (the one that executes Isar) instead of root. If the calling user's id is identical to one of an unprivileged user inside the image, this user is able to alter existing keys and deploy new ones, silently breaking the apt repo integrity protection. The issue is has no impact on those images that use an immutable rootfs, or if apt is never invoked. Changing only the keys does not trigger an exploit, it's just one step in a chain. An attacker would also have to manipulate a remote repo or intercept non-secure communication with it. This issue has been patched via commit 29e84ed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46531 | 1 Cacti | 1 Cacti | 2026-10-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. From version 1.2.27 to before version 1.2.31, Cacti contains an authenticated stored second-order SQL injection in the automation tree rule item handler. A user holding the Automation realm (default General Administration role) can persist an arbitrary SQL fragment in the automation_tree_rule_items.field column. The fragment is later concatenated directly into a SELECT ... AS source FROM ... clause in lib/api_automation.php :: create_all_header_nodes() and executed when an administrator triggers automation via the standard graphs.php?action=actions&drp_action=8 ("Apply Automation Rules") bulk action. The result of the injected SELECT is written into graph_tree_items.title and rendered in the Cacti tree UI, providing a direct exfiltration channe. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.31. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49442 | 1 Cacti | 1 Cacti | 2026-10-23 | 5.3 Medium |
| Cacti is an open source performance and fault management framework. Prior to version 1.2.31, a User Enumeration vulnerability allows an attacker to identify valid usernames on the Cacti service. When a user attempts to log in, the application returns slightly different error messages depending on whether the provided username exists in the system. When username exists on Cacti, in the response, they see Access Denied! Login failed. When it does not exist on Cacti, they see Access Denied! Login Failed. The only difference between the responses is the capitalization of the letter "f" in the word failed. This issue has been patched in version 1.2.31. | ||||
| CVE-2026-57845 | 1 Huggingface | 1 Datasets | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| Hugging Face Datasets through 5.1.0 contains an insecure deserialization vulnerability that allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code by crafting a malicious pickle file loaded through the deprecated pandas packaged builder. Attackers can supply a pickle-backed dataset that is processed by Pandas._generate_tables via pandas.read_pickle() without validation, so when a victim calls datasets.load_dataset("pandas", data_files=...), the embedded __reduce__ payload executes code with the victim process's privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-79982 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| The Bluetooth HCI USB transport class of the new USB device stack, subsys/usb/device_next/class/bt_hci.c, copies every controller-to-host HCI packet into a USB transfer buffer before enqueuing it on an endpoint. bt_hci_tx_sync_in() allocated that buffer from bt_hci_ep_pool, a fixed pool whose slots are only USBD_MAX_BULK_MPS bytes (64 on full-speed-only builds), and then performed net_buf_add_mem(buf, bt_buf->data, bt_buf->len) with no length check. HCI event and ACL buffers are sized by CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE and CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE and can be far larger, so the copy runs past the end of the 64-byte slot into the adjacent slots and into whatever follows the statically allocated pool. The device runs the local Bluetooth controller in raw HCI mode (CONFIG_BT_HCI_RAW), so the oversized packets originate over the air. With the HCI buffer sizes recommended for full-featured controllers, an unauthenticated attacker within Bluetooth range can supply the overflowing bytes: a connected peer that negotiates Data Length Extension can send ACL fragments up to CONFIG_BT_CTLR_DATA_LENGTH_MAX bytes, and an attacker that merely broadcasts extended advertising data reaches the same path through LE Extended Advertising Report events, which the controller fragments only to CONFIG_BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE. In the stock configuration the overflow is already reached without any radio traffic: the mandatory Read Supported Commands command-complete event is 70 bytes and overruns the 64-byte slot by six bytes on every host initialization. Because net_buf_add_mem() validates tailroom only through an assertion unless CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING is enabled, builds with CONFIG_ASSERT=n — the usual production setting — silently corrupt memory adjacent to the USB buffer pool with attacker-chosen contents, which on a target without memory protection between subsystems can lead to arbitrary code execution. Builds with assertions enabled fail the assertion instead and panic, giving a remotely triggerable denial of service. The fix introduces a separate bt_hci_tx_pool sized to MAX(BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE, BT_BUF_EVT_RX_SIZE) for the controller-to-host direction while leaving the host-to-device pool at the endpoint packet size, which is already bounds-checked during reassembly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-83813 | 1 Twisted | 1 Twisted | 2026-10-23 | 3.1 Low |
| Twisted is an event-based framework for internet applications, supporting Python 3.6+. Prior to 26.10.0rc1, twisted.names.dns.DNSDatagramProtocol accepts a UDP DNS response for a pending query when its 16-bit transaction ID matches but does not verify that the response came from the queried host and port. An attacker able to deliver a packet to the resolver's listening port with the correct transaction ID can inject a forged answer. The standard twisted.names.client.Resolver uses a new random source port for each query, increasing off-path attack complexity, while applications that reuse a DNSDatagramProtocol instance expose only the transaction-ID search space after the first query. A successful forgery can redirect hostname resolution and enable mail interception, server-side request forgery, or man-in-the-middle positioning. This issue is fixed in version 26.10.0rc1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98094 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: fbtft: make dirty_lock IRQ-safe fbtft_mkdirty() can be reached from the fbcon rendering path while processing printk() in hardirq context. Meanwhile, dirty_lock is also taken by fbtft_deferred_io() in workqueue context with local interrupts enabled. Lockdep reports a possible IRQ lock inversion involving dirty_lock and console_owner. A hardirq can interrupt a CPU holding dirty_lock and enter the console rendering path, which can attempt to acquire dirty_lock again. The following lockdep report was observed on an RK3566 system with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING enabled: WARNING: possible irq lock inversion dependency detected swapper/2/0 just changed the state of lock: (console_owner){-...}-{0:0} but this lock took another, HARDIRQ-unsafe lock in the past: (&par->dirty_lock){+.+.}-{2:2} CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&par->dirty_lock); local_irq_disable(); lock(console_owner); lock(&par->dirty_lock); <Interrupt> lock(console_owner); *** DEADLOCK *** Use spin_lock_irqsave() for fbtft_mkdirty() and spin_lock_irq() for fbtft_deferred_io(). They only access the dirty line range, so the IRQ-off regions remain short. | ||||