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Search Results (413889 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-108467 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft PostScript Printer Driver allows an authorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108461 | 1 Microsoft | 17 Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2, Windows 10 21h2 and 14 more | 2026-10-23 | 7 High |
| Use after free in Windows Broadcast DVR User Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108465 | 1 Microsoft | 20 Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2, Windows 10 21h2 and 17 more | 2026-10-23 | 7 High |
| Use after free in Windows Update Delivery Optimization allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-49785 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-23 | 7.8 High |
| Improper resource shutdown or release in Windows UEFI allows an authorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69913 | 1 Microsoft | 28 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 25 more | 2026-10-23 | 8.1 High |
| Use after free in Windows TCP/IP allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-69942 | 1 Microsoft | 13 Windows 11 23h2, Windows 11 23h2, Windows 11 24h2 and 10 more | 2026-10-23 | 7.8 High |
| Buffer over-read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108437 | 1 Microsoft | 5 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 2 more | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108440 | 1 Microsoft | 11 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021 and 8 more | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-108448 | 1 Microsoft | 11 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021 and 8 more | 2026-10-23 | 7.5 High |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98932 | 1 Linux | 2 Linux, Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: EDAC/altera: Fix use-after-free in error paths In both altr_edac_a10_device_add() and altr_portb_setup(), the error path freed the dci structure before releasing the devres group. Since the managed single and double bit IRQ handlers use altdev(dci->pvt_info) as their data, an IRQ firing between freeing dci and unregistering the IRQs could dereference the freed memory. Release the devres group first so the managed IRQs are unregistered before the dci structure is freed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-50787 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| e-SIC Livre (esiclivre) v0.2.2 and earlier contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in restrito/inc/captcha.php. The application uses user-supplied parameters (l, a, tf, ql) without validation to generate CAPTCHA images, allowing remote attackers to cause denial of service via excessive memory and CPU consumption. | ||||
| CVE-2026-10572 | 1 Ibm | 3 Mq Advanced Container Images, Mq Operator, Supplied Mq Advanced Container Images | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| IBM MQ could allow an authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code due to a heap buffer overflow when processing MQPUT operations with malformed message options. | ||||
| CVE-2026-52356 | 2026-10-23 | N/A | ||
| An OS command injection vulnerability in the /htdocs/web/diagnostic.php endpoint of D-Link DAP1160L A1_FW101WWb04 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands via injecting arbitrary shell metacharacters. | ||||
| CVE-2026-10574 | 1 Ibm | 3 Mq Advanced Container Images, Mq Operator, Supplied Mq Advanced Container Images | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| IBM MQ could allow an authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service or potentially execute arbitrary code due to a heap buffer overflow when processing MQPUT or MQPUT1 operations with malformed message handle properties. | ||||
| CVE-2026-10743 | 1 Ibm | 3 Mq Advanced Container Images, Mq Operator, Supplied Mq Advanced Container Images | 2026-10-23 | 8.8 High |
| IBM MQ could allow an authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service or corrupt memory due to improper validation of buffer sizes in MQOPEN operations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98992 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: don't copy an unmounted mount tree may_copy_tree() accepts a mount whose root is an nsfs or pidfs file before it checks whether that mount is mounted. This exception exists for nsfs and pidfs mounts. They are part of no mount namespace so neither check_mnt() nor is_mounted() would let them through and bind-mounting a nsfsfd or a pidfd wouldn't work. Problem is that exception also admits a bind mount of such a file when it was lazily unmounted and is only kept alive by a file descriptor: mount --bind /proc/self/ns/net /tmp/x exec 3< /tmp/x umount -l /tmp/x mount --rbind /proc/self/fd/3 /tmp/y With MS_REC or AT_RECURSIVE copy_tree() doesn't stop at the unmounted mount. It copies every mount that stayed attached to it as well. So if you have a bunch of overmounts over the nsfsfd or the pidfd the whole unmounted stack is copied. That's a bug. So refuse to walk an unmounted tree. Copying its root alone stays possible. So a bind mount of a namespace that is gone can still be recreated from a file descriptor on the old one. The file descriptor pins that mount and its root and __has_locked_children() only reads the direct children which don't leave the parent's list without namespace_sem. The internal mounts carry MNT_NS_INTERNAL instead of NULL and are still walked. Copying an unmounted tree recursively fails with EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: statmount: read the parent of an unmounted mount under mount_lock statmount_mnt_basic() reads the ids of the parent through m->mnt_parent with namespace_sem held for reading. That's fine for a mount that is in a namespace. Everything above it is pinned by that namespace. STATMOUNT_BY_FD also accepts a file descriptor on a mount that has been unmounted on purpose and that only the file descriptor keeps alive. If that mount stayed attached to its parent when it was unmounted the parent is unmounted as well and nothing pins it for the child. The final mntput() unmounts the children under mount_lock alone and frees the parent afterwards. Concurrently, statmount_mnt_basic() reads m->mnt_parent twice while that can happen and can easily dereference a mount that's already gone. Read the parent of an unmounted mount under mount_lock. The parent can't be put while it is held and both ids come from the same mount. A mounted mount's parent is pinned by the namespace and a mount can't leave its namespace while namespace_sem is held, so the common case takes no global lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98995 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: reset the old parent's ->overmount in mnt_change_mountpoint() __umount_mnt() resets ->overmount of the parent when it unmounts the mount that overmounts it. mnt_change_mountpoint() doesn't. It moves the mount to its new parent and leaves the old one pointing at it. For a mount that is moved beneath in attach_recursive_mnt() that doesn't matter. The new mount has already reset ->overmount of the old parent by the time the old top mount is moved onto it. It matters for reparent() though. propagate_umount() moves a surviving overmount onto the first ancestor that isn't going to be unmounted. The mount it was taken from is unmounted immediately afterwards. If a file descriptor keeps that unmounted mount alive ->overmount points at the moved mount. That's a dangling pointer and UAF as the moved mount is unmounted and freed. do_lock_mount() follows ->overmount from the target path under mount_lock. With a file descriptor on such a mount as the target of a mount beneath topmost_overmount() walks into the freed mount and do_lock_mount() takes references on whatever it finds there. So reset ->overmount of the old parent in mnt_change_mountpoint() the same way __umount_mnt() does. A mount's ->overmount is then always a mount that is attached to it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98996 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: don't silently unmount busy mounts The propagate_mount_busy() helper exists to decide whether a synchronous can suceed. It does that by looking at the copies of the victims in the mounts its parent propagates to. One of those functions from propagation hell. It skips a copy that has child mounts except for the case of a single child mount covering the copy's root. That algorithm used to be exact. It isn't anymore. Originally only childless copies were unmounted during propagation. And 1064f874abc0 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.") ended up adding covered mounts to both sides in one go. Along came 99b19d16471e ("mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order") and that started to unmount more than before: [1]: A copy of a mount is unmounted when each of its children is either its overmount or a copy of the victim itself. In the former case the overmount gets reparented. In the latter case the copy of the victim will end up being unmounted. So propagate_umount() ended up being rewritten without adjusting propagate_mount_busy(). And currently propagate_mount_busy() doesn't look at copies of the victim that have two or more children nor a single child that is not the overmount. So any such copy in [1] is not checked for references. The result is that a synchronous unmount succeeds, pulling out a mount that is still in use. A container can run into this with its own mounts. The host shares a tree with the container and the host has a mount in that tree: mount -t tmpfs none /mnt mount --make-shared /mnt mount -t tmpfs none /mnt/a The container's /mnt is a slave copy of the host mount. The container now takes a detached copy of the tree and mounts that copy beneath its propagated copy of /mnt/a and keeps the file descriptor to the tree open: unshare -m --propagation unchanged mount --make-rslave / fd = open_tree(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", OPEN_TREE_CLONE | AT_RECURSIVE) move_mount(fd, "", AT_FDCWD, "/mnt/a", MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH) grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 777 775 ... /mnt/a ... master:646 776 777 ... /mnt/a ... master:647 778 777 ... /mnt/a/a ... master:647 The now attached tree (777) is now mounted beneath the container's copy of /mnt/a. That's also where the host mount sits (as seen from the host mount namespace). So the propagated copy (776) of the host's mount is on top of its root and the copy of that (778) is inside it. Now the host runs: umount /mnt/a and it succeeds. The moved tree tree and the copy inside of it are gone from the container. Now only the propagated copy is left and it got reparented to where it was before: grep /mnt /proc/self/mountinfo 775 355 ... /mnt ... master:646 776 775 ... /mnt/a ... But the file descriptor still refers to the moved tree. So a synchronous umount detached a mount that is still in use. Teach propagate_mount_busy() the same checks that propagate_umount() does. It now checks for a single victim mount without children for which it can assume that MNT_LOCKED is cleared on every copy like propagate_umount() does. The copies form chains. IOW, when a copy itself receives propagation from the victim's parent then the mount at the same mountpoint inside that copy is a copy as well. Whether a mount receives propagation from the victim's can simply be checked by walking its masters. Walk each chain once from its top so we are sure that nested copies stay linear. Check every reference once of every copy that gets unmounted. | ||||
| CVE-2026-99000 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-23 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Fix shrinker accounting double-subtraction on nested external pins xe_bo_pin_external() and xe_bo_unpin_external() support nested pins, since the underlying ttm_bo_pin()/ttm_bo_unpin() maintain a pin_count refcount rather than a boolean. However, the shrinker accounting calls xe_ttm_tt_account_subtract() and xe_ttm_tt_account_add() are invoked unconditionally on every pin_external()/unpin_external() call, instead of only on the transition into and out of the pinned state. An external BO (dma-buf) can be pinned more than once while already pinned, for example when it has multiple attachments/importers, each independently calling xe_bo_pin_external(). Each such nested pin subtracts the BO's pages from the shrinker's accounting again, even though the BO's pages were already removed from consideration by the first pin. Symmetrically, each nested unpin adds them back again before the BO is actually unpinned. This desynchronizes the shrinker's page and object counts from reality, and since they are declared as signed long but interpreted as unsigned long in xe_shrinker_count(), the underflow can turn into an enormous shrinkable/purgeable page count, causing the shrinker to be invoked excessively under memory pressure. Guard the accounting calls with the same pin-count transition checks already used to guard the pinned_link list maintenance, so accounting is only updated on the outermost pin and the final unpin. While centralizing this logic into xe_bo_account_pin()/ xe_bo_account_unpin(), also close a second, related accounting gap affecting imported dma-bufs. For an imported bo's ttm_tt, xe's ttm_tt_populate hook (xe_ttm_tt_populate()) early-returns without calling xe_ttm_tt_account_add(), since TTM_TT_FLAG_EXTERNAL is set without TTM_TT_FLAG_EXTERNAL_MAPPABLE. However, TTM core's ttm_tt_populate() wrapper unconditionally marks the tt as populated on driver-hook success, so ttm_tt_is_populated() still reports true for it. xe_bo_account_pin()/xe_bo_account_unpin() trusted ttm_tt_is_populated() as a proxy for "these pages are accounted for by the shrinker", and would subtract/add pages for such a tt that were never added in the first place, again underflowing the shrinker's counts. This is reachable today via xe_bo_pin_external(), and would have become newly reachable via the fb-pin path once this patch routes __xe_pin_fb_vma() through xe_bo_pin_account() below, so fix it here rather than in a later patch, to avoid a commit in this series that introduces the regression before fixing it. Skip the accounting for imported bos, using the same EXTERNAL && !EXTERNAL_MAPPABLE test xe_ttm_tt_populate()/xe_ttm_tt_unpopulate() use to decide whether to act, via a new xe_ttm_bo_is_imported() helper (hoisted up from its only prior use site). v2: - Fix the critical issue caught by Sashiko AI review: the pin-count transition check introduced here was still bypassed by the fb-pin path (__xe_pin_fb_vma()/__xe_unpin_fb_vma()), which could leave a stale pinned_link entry and a permanent shrinker accounting leak when the fb-unpin performed the true last unpin. Addressed in a separate follow-up patch in this series rather than folded in here, since it is a distinct bug with its own Fixes: tag. - Drop the unneeded local "last_unpin" variable in xe_bo_unpin_external(), restoring the original inline bo->ttm.pin_count == 1 check; it was a no-op rename not used by any of the new accounting helpers, and was going to be deleted again by the follow-up patch anyway. v3: - Exclude imported dma-bufs from the pin/unpin shrinker accounting, fixing another underflow caught by Sashiko AI review. - Add a short comment on the backup-object pin site noting it's already populated/accounted at pin time, addressing (as a false-positive clarification, no code fix needed) a separate Medium-severity accounting-leak concern also caught by Sashiko AI ---truncated--- | ||||