| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 13.0.0, Pillow's ImageMorph.MorphOp.apply() can access memory before a row buffer for a zero-width image. PPM and PGM input can create an image with width zero, and the native morphology routine indexes outrow[width - 1] without rejecting that geometry. An attacker can supply such an image to an application that applies a morphology operation. This can crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Prior to 13.0.0, Pillow can double free image memory when ImagingScaleAffine encounters a selective allocation failure. The affected fast path handles Transform.EXTENT or pure scale-and-translate Transform.AFFINE operations with the default NEAREST resampling. The output image allocation must succeed while the additional per-column lookup allocation fails, after which the error path deletes image storage that later cleanup releases again. An attacker who can drive such a large Image.transform() operation under memory pressure may trigger the failure. This can crash the process and may corrupt memory. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 8.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow's TIFF tile and RGBA decode paths can read beyond row data produced by libtiff. In _decodeTile and the RGBA unpacker path, when Pillow and libtiff interpret duplicated PhotometricInterpretation or BitsPerSample tags differently, Pillow does not verify that the required input row fits inside the row libtiff produced, while the strip path has this validation. Loading pixels from such a crafted TIFF can expose adjacent heap data in output pixels or crash the process. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue()
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue() validates the skb length using skb->len
before dereferencing pointers into skb->data to access the 802.11 header.
However, skb->len includes data in both the linear head buffer and
non-linear fragments/pages. When AF_PACKET sends a packet large enough to
become non-linear, the 802.11 header at skb->data + len_rthdr may extend
past the linear head buffer even though skb->len appears sufficient.
This leads to a slab-out-of-bounds read when accessing hdr->frame_control,
as the kernel reads beyond the allocated skb head buffer:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0x1ed/0x220
syzbot has hit the same issues.
Fix this by checking skb_headlen(skb) (which gives the length of the
linear data region) instead of skb->len before dereferencing skb->data
pointers. This ensures the required bytes are actually present in the
linear portion of the skb.
Apply the same fix to ieee80211_validate_radiotap_len() which has the
same class of bug: it uses skb->len to validate accesses to skb->data,
and to the corresponding checks in ieee80211_monitor_start_xmit(): for
drivers advertising NETIF_F_SG the skb is not linearized before
ndo_start_xmit, so the 802.11 header can be read past the linear
buffer there as well. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm_early_create: fix freeing used table on dm_resume failure
If dm_resume fails, the kernel attempts to free table with
dm_table_destroy, but the table was already instantiated with
dm_swap_table. This commit skips the call to dm_table_destroy in this
case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dma-fence: Make dma_fence_dedup_array() robust against 0-count input
dma_fence_dedup_array() returns 1 when called with num_fences == 0:
the for-loop body never executes, j stays at 0, and the final
`return ++j` yields 1. This contradicts both the kernel-doc ("Return:
Number of unique fences remaining in the array") and the natural
expectation that 0 input gives 0 output.
The caller __dma_fence_unwrap_merge() bails out via the
`if (count == 0 || count == 1)` fast path and so is save.
But amdgpu_userq_wait_*() could reach the dedup call with a zero local
count and dereference an uninitialized fence slot in the array.
Make the contract match the documentation by returning 0 early. This
also skips an unnecessary sort() call on an empty array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Validate the packet length reported by the NIC
Validate the packet length reported in the RX CQE before passing it
to skb processing. The CQE is supplied by the NIC device and should
not be blindly trusted. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ip_vti: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
vti_changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the
tunnel link netns t->net. They differ once the device is created in or
moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl
changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a
caller privileged there but not in t->net can rewrite a tunnel that
lives in t->net.
Gate vti_changelink() on rtnl_dev_link_net_capable() at its top,
before any attribute is parsed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: use parsed transport offset in SCTP state lookup
set_sctp_state() reads the SCTP chunk header again in order to drive the
IPVS SCTP state table. For IPv6 it computes the offset with
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code uses iph.len from
ip_vs_fill_iph_skb(), where ipv6_find_hdr() has already skipped
extension headers and found the real transport header.
This makes the state machine read from the wrong offset for IPv6 SCTP
packets that carry extension headers. For example, an INIT packet with an
8-byte destination options header can be scheduled correctly by
sctp_conn_schedule(), but set_sctp_state() reads the first byte of the
SCTP verification tag as a DATA chunk type. The connection then moves
from NONE to ESTABLISHED instead of INIT1, gets the longer established
timeout, and updates the active/inactive destination counters
incorrectly. This happens even though the SCTP handshake has not
completed.
Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() for
the SCTP chunk-header lookup. For IPv4 and IPv6 packets without
extension headers this preserves the existing offset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: fix heap overflow on a short auth frame
brcmf_notify_auth_frame_rx() takes the frame length from the firmware
event and copies the frame body with the management header offset
subtracted:
u32 mgmt_frame_len = e->datalen - sizeof(struct brcmf_rx_mgmt_data);
...
memcpy(&mgmt_frame->u, frame,
mgmt_frame_len - offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u));
The only length check is e->datalen >= sizeof(*rxframe), so mgmt_frame_len
can be anything from 0 up. offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) is 24. When
mgmt_frame_len is below that, the subtraction wraps as an unsigned value to
a huge length. The memcpy then runs far past the kzalloc'd buffer. A
malicious or malfunctioning AP can make the frame short during the
external SAE auth exchange, so this is a remotely triggered heap overflow.
Reject frames shorter than the management header offset before the copy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btrtl: validate firmware patch bounds
rtlbt_parse_firmware() copies patch_length - 4 bytes before appending the
firmware version. A malformed firmware patch shorter than the version field
can make this subtraction underflow and turn the copy into an oversized
read and write during Bluetooth setup.
The existing patch_offset + patch_length check can also wrap on 32-bit
architectures. Validate the patch length and range without arithmetic
overflow before allocating or copying the patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA AES cipher key requests
cca_cipher2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Validate length for CCA ECC private key requests
cca_ecc2protkey() derives the copy length for the CPRB parameter
block directly from the length field in the key token. Reject the
request early if the token length exceeds the available space in the
parameter block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size
This field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific
limits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len
handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.
A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.
Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active
DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send.
The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has
either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment.
That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel
RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state
before the full TID and source address are checked against a real
request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side
insertion path even though the response would not match any send.
For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing
ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher
already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID
against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is
no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state.
This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects
responses that have no corresponding request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: bound element ID read when checking non-inheritance
cfg80211_is_element_inherited() reads the first data octet of the
candidate element (id = elem->data[0]) to look it up in an extension
non-inheritance list. It does so after testing elem->id, but without
verifying that the element actually has a data octet. A zero-length
extension element (WLAN_EID_EXTENSION with length 0) therefore makes it
read one octet past the end of the element.
_ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() runs this check for every element of a
frame once a non-inheritance context exists -- e.g. while parsing a
per-STA profile of a Multi-Link element in a (re)association response,
or a non-transmitted BSS profile -- so a crafted frame from an AP can
trigger a one-octet slab-out-of-bounds read during element parsing:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in cfg80211_is_element_inherited
Read of size 1 ... in net/wireless/scan.c
Return early (treat the element as inherited) when an extension element
carries no data, mirroring the existing handling of empty ID lists.
The bug was found by fuzzing ieee802_11_parse_elems_full() under KASAN. |
