| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| libming through 0.4.8 contains a heap buffer overflow in r_readc() in src/blocks/fromswf.c. A crafted SWF file with a malformed or truncated RECT header can cause a denial of service. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: sr: enforce exact attribute length for SEG6_ATTR_DST
In seg6_genl_policy, SEG6_ATTR_DST is defined with .type = NLA_BINARY and
.len = sizeof(struct in6_addr). For NLA_BINARY, .len only enforces the
maximum payload length and permits shorter payloads (e.g., 0 bytes).
When seg6_genl_set_tunsrc() copies sizeof(struct in6_addr) bytes via
kmemdup(val, sizeof(*val), GFP_KERNEL), a short SEG6_ATTR_DST attribute
triggers a 16-byte out-of-bounds read past skb->tail into uninitialized
skb->head memory, which is stored in sdata->tun_src and leaked back to
userspace via SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC.
Switch SEG6_ATTR_DST in seg6_genl_policy to
NLA_POLICY_EXACT_LEN(sizeof(struct in6_addr)) so that generic netlink
validation rejects any attribute whose length is not exactly
sizeof(struct in6_addr) with -ERANGE.
Tested in QEMU against Linux 7.3.0-rc3 by sending a SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC
Generic Netlink message with a 0-byte SEG6_ATTR_DST attribute followed
by SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC. On the unfixed kernel, SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC
succeeds (err = 0) and SEG6_CMD_GET_TUNSRC leaks 16 bytes of
uninitialized kernel heap memory (tun_src =
836a61ecc4d25a1042a8d60411cfb378); with this patch applied,
SEG6_CMD_SET_TUNSRC is rejected by netlink policy validation with
-ERANGE (-34) and tun_src remains zeroed. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in HID class driver allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-af: cn10k: restrict VF LMTLINE sharing to its own PF
rvu_mbox_handler_lmtst_tbl_setup() uses req->base_pcifunc as a direct
index into the LMT map table to read another function's LMTLINE
physical base address and copy it into the caller's own LMT map table
entry. The mailbox dispatcher authenticates req->hdr.pcifunc from the
IRQ source, but req->base_pcifunc is a separate payload field and is
not sanitized.
Reject the request with -EPERM when a VF caller's base_pcifunc is not a
valid function under its own PF. is_pf_func_valid() bounds the FUNC field
to the PF's configured VF count, keeping the computed index inside the
caller's own slot block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ip6t_rt: fix zero-address non-strict match out-of-bounds read
rt_mt6_check() permits rules to be configured with rtinfo->addrnr == 0
even when address matching (IP6T_RT_FST_MASK) is requested.
In the IP6T_RT_FST_NSTRICT path, rt_mt6() evaluates packet routing
addresses against rtinfo->addrs[i] and terminates backwards at the bottom
of the loop:
if (ipv6_addr_equal(ap, &rtinfo->addrs[i])) {
i++;
}
if (i == rtinfo->addrnr)
break;
When addrnr is 0, if the first packet address matches rtinfo->addrs[0],
i is incremented to 1. Because i is now strictly greater than addrnr (0),
the loop termination condition (i == rtinfo->addrnr) is bypassed and will
never be satisfied.
If a crafted IPv6 packet contains matching routing addresses, i will
advance past IP6T_RT_HOPS (16). The subsequent call to ipv6_addr_equal()
reads beyond struct ip6t_rt, triggering UBSAN/KASAN out-of-bounds warnings
or kernel panics.
Fix this by:
1. Rejecting rules in rt_mt6_check() where IP6T_RT_FST_MASK is set but
rtinfo->addrnr is zero.
2. In rt_mt6(), moving the termination condition (i < rtinfo->addrnr)
into the for-loop header condition and removing the backwards break
at the end of the loop body. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: harden POSIX SID length parsing
posix_info_sid_size() reads sid[1] to obtain the subauthority count,
but its existing boundary check still accepts buffers with only one
remaining byte. Require two bytes before reading sid[1] so all client
paths that reuse the helper reject truncated POSIX SIDs safely. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Text Shaping allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: esp: restore combined single-frag length gate
The ESP out-of-place fast path appends the trailer in esp_output_head()
before esp_output_tail() allocates the destination page frag. The
head-side gate currently checks skb->data_len and tailen separately, but
the tail code allocates a single destination frag from the combined
post-trailer skb->data_len.
Reject the page-frag fast path when the combined aligned length exceeds a
page. Otherwise skb_page_frag_refill() may fall back to a single page while
the destination sg still spans the combined skb->data_len.
Restore this combined-length page gate for both IPv4 and IPv6. |
| Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input in certain ASUS router models allows an adjacent authenticated user to corrupt device operations and cause a denial of service via an HTTP request with input exceeding the expected length.
Refer to the ' Security Update for ASUS Router Firmware' section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: nfcmrvl: validate helper command length before pull
The firmware download receive path removes the NCI data header and
reads the helper command before validating the remaining packet length.
A short frame can therefore reach the data access before the malformed
packet is rejected.
Validate the complete helper command length before stripping the NCI
data header. |
