| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A vulnerability in the firmware upgrade functionality could allow an authenticated attacker to upload a forged firmware upgrade file, potentially compromising the device permanently. |
| Missing expiration, hash, and length enforcement in delegated metadata validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users with delegated signing authority to bypass TUF specification integrity checks for delegated targets metadata and poison the local metadata cache, because load_delegations does not apply the same validation checks as the top-level targets metadata path.
We recommend you upgrade to tough-v0.22.0 / tuftool-v0.15.0. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature uniqueness in delegated role validation in awslabs/tough before tough-v0.22.0 allows remote authenticated users to bypass the TUF signature threshold requirement by duplicating a valid signature, causing the client to accept forged delegated role metadata.
We recommend you upgrade to tough-v0.22.0 / tuftool-v0.15.0. |
| FileRise is a self-hosted web-based file manager with multi-file upload, editing, and batch operations. Prior to 3.23.0, FileRise maps an authenticated OIDC identity to a local account using mutable preferred_username or email claims and does not require email_verified for email-based naming. An attacker who can obtain provider-issued claims colliding with an existing local username can be logged in as that account, including the built-in administrator, even when automatic provisioning is disabled. Exploitability depends on the configured identity provider allowing the colliding claim. This issue is fixed in version 3.23.0. |
| OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCE_EXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2. |
| Improper verification of cryptographic signature in Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network. |
| Origin validation error in .NET allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature over a network. |
| AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.4, an attacker can send an absolute-form request that causes Request.scheme to use attacker-controlled request-target scheme data instead of the connection protocol. Applications that use Request.scheme for security decisions can consequently be tricked into treating an unencrypted connection as encrypted or an encrypted connection as unencrypted. This issue is fixed in version 3.14.4. |
| Locust through 2.46.7 contains a cross-site request forgery vulnerability that allows remote attackers to stop load tests or reset statistics via GET requests to /stop and /stats/reset. Attackers can lure an operator to a malicious page triggering cross-site GET requests, terminating running swarms and wiping recorded performance results. |
| undici is an HTTP client library for Node.js. In versions 7.0.0 through 7.30.0 and 8.0.0 through 8.12.1, when an originless Agent composes the redirect and cache interceptors in that order with a shared cache store, the cache builds its key from the original request URL before the redirect handler changes the origin, so a response produced after a cross-origin redirect is stored under the original key. An attacker who controls the target of a redirect from a trusted URL can have their response cached under that trusted URL and served to later callers, allowing persistent cache poisoning, and the same key confusion lets a private, non-stored redirect response to a user-specific resource be stored under the original URL and served to a later unauthenticated caller, disclosing private data. Applications are affected only when an originless Agent, a shared cache store, and the redirect-then-cache composition are all used. The issue is fixed in undici 7.30.1 and 8.12.2, which verify the producing origin still matches the cache key and preserve each redirect hop's cache-control policy before storing, and users should upgrade to one of those versions or later. As a workaround, compose the cache interceptor before the redirect interceptor, use per-origin dispatchers and cache stores, or disable shared caching on redirect-capable requests. |
| In Znuny through 7.3.6, an attacker can bypass specific standard login procedures and gain unauthorized access to sensitive system functions by manipulating a specific HTTP request header. Because the application incorrectly trusts this header, an attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, without requiring a password. This grants full access to confidential data and system controls. More specifically, the HTTPBasicAuth modules for the agent (Kernel::System::Auth::HTTPBasicAuth) and customer (Kernel::System::CustomerAuth::HTTPBasicAuth) interfaces read the username to log in not only from $ENV{REMOTE_USER} (set by the web server after successful authentication), but also, as a fallback, from $ENV{HTTP_REMOTE_USER}, which is populated directly from an attacker-controllable "Remote-User" request header. On systems where HTTPBasicAuth was configured as the authentication backend, this allowed an attacker to log in as any existing user by sending a request with a forged Remote-User header, without providing any credentials. |
| Wheels through 4.1.1 derives its default production error-email address from the Host header of the request that starts the application. If no explicit error-email recipient is configured, a mail server is configured, and the server accepts an attacker-chosen Host, an attacker whose request triggers a cold start can direct later error emails to an address under their control for that application's lifetime. Emails disclose error and request metadata; on engines/versions where scope dumps render, they may also disclose configuration secrets and other users' session/cookie data. On the Lucee 7 engine, scope dumps fail to render, limiting disclosure to header fields. This is fixed in 4.1.2. |
| Use of a less trusted source in the DKIM signing of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.0.0 through 6.3.6 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to have mail they write signed with the DKIM key of a domain the server hosts, so that it passes DKIM and DMARC for that domain at other receivers. With DKIM signing enabled for a hosted domain, the server signed every message on its first delivery pass as the domain named in its From header, before local delivery, whatever the message's origin and without checking that its sender had authenticated. A sender anywhere could therefore send the server, as ordinary inbound mail, a message whose From is any address at such a domain, and the server signed it with that domain's key. Every copy the server then sent on to an address outside carried a valid signature aligned with the forged From, whatever the domain's DMARC policy: an account's forward, a mail rule's forward or copy, a Sieve redirect, an alias or distribution list with an outside member, the mirror copy, a managed-list or journal copy, or a message released from quarantine. A signed copy can also be re-sent to other recipients while the domain's key is unchanged. Exploitation needs DKIM signing to be enabled for the hosted domain (it is off until configured) and, for the forgery to leave the server, a forward, alias, list or rule that carries the domain's mail to an outside address. The signer likewise signed a message submitted over authenticated SMTP as whatever hosted domain its From header named, a header authenticated SMTP does not hold to the submitting account, so that an account of one hosted domain could have mail written in the name of another hosted domain signed with that domain's key; this mattered where the server holds signed-in senders to their own envelope addresses (SmtpAuthenticatedSenderCheck, off by default), as the signature was then the remaining way for such mail to pass the other domain's DMARC policy. |
| Same-origin policy bypass in the WebExtensions component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox ESR 153.4, Thunderbird 157, Thunderbird 140.17, Thunderbird 153.4, Firefox 157, Firefox ESR 115.42, and Firefox ESR 140.17. |
| A flaw was found in Submariner. This vulnerability allows a malicious cluster (spoke) to redirect network traffic from other connected clusters (peer clusters) by publishing a specially crafted network endpoint. The system fails to properly validate the network subnets provided by the malicious cluster, enabling it to declare arbitrary network ranges. Consequently, all network traffic intended for these arbitrary ranges from peer clusters will be rerouted through the attacker's tunnel, potentially leading to unauthorized information disclosure or network disruption. |
| LangBot through 4.11.0 contains a missing authenticity verification vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject forged Lark/Feishu events by skipping signature checks. Attackers knowing a bot UUID can POST fabricated im.message.receive_v1 or card.action.trigger events to drive the LLM pipeline, tools, and approvals as other users. |
| A vulnerability was determined in BlackBeltTechnology pi-agent-dashboard up to 0.8.0. The affected element is an unknown function of the file /BlackBeltTechnology/pi-agent-dashboard of the component WebSocket Gateway. Executing a manipulation of the argument cwd can lead to origin validation error. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized. Upgrading to version 0.9.0 is sufficient to fix this issue. This patch is called 48fd0bad5adfe76af9736599699d51a5f60019f6. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. |
| Coder before 2.34.7 contains an IP spoofing vulnerability in the ExtractRealIPAddress middleware that trusts the leftmost, client-supplied X-Forwarded-For value instead of the client IP appended by a reverse proxy. Attackers can send forged X-Forwarded-For values through appending proxies to bypass per-IP rate limits on login, one-time passcode, and password validation endpoints, enabling brute-force attacks, and to falsify IP addresses recorded in audit logs. |
| A flaw was found in the lighthouse component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes. This vulnerability stems from insufficient validation of advertised IP addresses within EndpointSlice objects. A compromised spoke cluster can exploit this by creating EndpointSlices with attacker-controlled IP addresses, causing other clusters' lighthouse DNS to redirect legitimate service traffic to malicious endpoints. This enables a remote attacker to conduct transparent Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks on cross-cluster service communications, potentially leading to unauthorized information disclosure and data manipulation. |
| A flaw was found in RESTEasy's CorsFilter, which, when configured to allow all origins ("*"), reflects the request's Origin header back in the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. This permissive cross-origin policy allows a malicious website to make credentialed cross-origin requests and read authenticated responses from a victim's session, resulting in a loss of confidentiality. |
