| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the AMF parser in Apache bRPC < 1.18.0 allows a remote RTMP peer to crash a bRPC process by sending deeply nested AMF objects or arrays. The parser recursively processed nested AMF containers without enforcing a depth limit, which could exhaust the native stack.
Affected Scenarios:
Applications using bRPC RTMP support and parsing AMF data from an untrusted RTMP peer. This includes RTMP servers parsing client command messages, RTMP clients parsing server responses or status messages, and either side parsing inbound AMF script data such as metadata or cue points. Direct callers of ReadAMFObject or ReadAMFArray on untrusted input are also affected.
How to Fix:
1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to 1.18.0.
2. Apply the patch from PR https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3344 .
Note:
The fix introduces a configurable AMF nesting depth limit with default value 128. AMF objects or arrays deeper than amf_max_depth are rejected after applying the fix. |
| A deeply nested multipart MIME structure constructed via the public API causes
a stack overflow in libcurl during normal cleanup operations. An excessive
recursion depth within `curl_mime_free` leads to unbounded stack frame
allocation during structure traversal, ultimately crashing the host process. |
| ApostropheCMS is an open-source Node.js content management system. In sanitize-html 2.18.0, when an <iframe> is not allowed and disallowedTagsMode is 'discard' (the defaults), its raw-text content is re-sanitized by a recursive call to sanitizeHtml(text, options). The recursion has no bound and starts each nested call with a fresh state. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.1. |
| Smithy-RS is a Rust code generation and runtime framework that generates HTTP clients and servers from Smithy interface definitions, powering the AWS SDK for Rust and custom service implementations.
Uncontrolled recursion in the JSON, CBOR, and XML deserializer functions emitted by Amazon smithy-rs code generation could allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process abort via stack exhaustion) via a small request containing deeply nested data for a recursive model shape to a generated SDK or server.
To mitigate this issue, users should upgrade to aws-sdk-rust release-2026-06-02 or later. Users building custom servers with smithy-rs codegen should regenerate from smithy-rs release-2026-06-01 or later. |
| The workaround for XSA-433 (Zenbleed, CVE-2023-20593) was later
re-worked to better integrate with other manipulations of the same MSR.
In this rework an inverted conditional was introduced, resulting in the
workaround to not be applied when needed and vice versa.
For more details, see:
http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-433.html |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. From 5.1.0 until 13.0.0, Pillow can exhaust resources while parsing an existing PDF during an append operation. PdfParser follows page-tree child references without cycle or duplication tracking and follows previous-trailer chains with only an exact repeated-offset guard, so deep or cyclic page trees and long chains of unique trailer offsets can exhaust the Python stack. Repeated non-cyclic /Kids references can also cause super-linear CPU and memory use. An attacker can supply such a PDF to an application that calls Image.save with PDF append enabled. This can raise an uncaught RecursionError or consume excessive CPU and memory before output is written, causing denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 13.0.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_ct: bail out on template ct in get eval
I noticed this issue while looking at a historic syzbot report [1].
A rule like the one below is enough to trigger the bug:
table ip t {
chain pre {
type filter hook prerouting priority raw;
ct zone set 1
ct original saddr 1.2.3.4 accept
}
}
The first expression attaches a per-cpu template ct via
nft_ct_set_zone_eval() (nf_ct_tmpl_alloc -> kzalloc, tuple is all
zero, nf_ct_l3num(ct) == 0). The next expression then calls
nft_ct_get_eval() on the same skb, treats the template as a real ct
and hits the 16-byte memcpy path. With dreg at NFT_REG32_15 this
overflows past struct nft_regs on the kernel stack; with smaller
dreg values it silently clobbers adjacent registers.
Reject template ct at the eval entry and in nft_ct_get_fast_eval(),
mirroring the check nft_ct_set_eval() already has. Additionally,
bound the address copy in NFT_CT_SRC / NFT_CT_DST by priv->len
instead of by nf_ct_l3num(ct): nf_ct_get_tuple() zeroes the tuple
before pkt_to_tuple() fills in only the protocol-relevant leading
bytes, so the trailing bytes of tuple->{src,dst}.u3.all are
well-defined zero. priv->len is validated at rule load, so the
copy size is now bounded by the destination register rather than
by an untrusted field on the conntrack.
[1]: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=389cf09cb72926114fce90dc85a2c3231dcb647c |
| Cpanel::JSON::XS versions before 4.80 for Perl allow stack exhaustion via nested tagged values under allow_tags in decode_tag.
With allow_tags, "(" starts a tagged value. Its tag and value are decoded recursively, and each can start another tagged value. Unlike arrays and objects, this nesting is not counted against max_depth.
A run of "(" bytes exhausts the C stack and triggers an uncatchable segmentation fault regardless of max_depth. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm thin metadata: fix metadata snapshot consistency on commit failure
__reserve_metadata_snap() and __release_metadata_snap() modify the
superblock's held_root directly in the block_manager's buffer. If the
subsequent metadata commit fails, the held_root gets flushed to disk
through the abort_transaction path, resulting in inconsistent metadata.
Reproducer 1: __reserve_metadata_snap()
1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 14th
block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the
subsequent reserve_metadata_snap operation. The 14th block will be
the shadow destination for the index block.
dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 112 linear /dev/sdc 0
112 3984 error"
2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool
dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1
dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \
/dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing"
3. Take a metadata snapshot to trigger metadata commit failure and
transaction abort. However, the held_root is written to disk,
breaking metadata consistency.
dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap"
thin_check v1.2.2 result:
Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 2, but space map contains 1.
Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 2, but space map contains 1.
Bad reference count for metadata block 13. Expected 1, but space map contains 0.
Reproducer 2: __release_metadata_snap()
1. Create a 2 MiB metadata device and make the region after the 16th
block inaccessible, to trigger metadata commit failure in the
subsequent release_metadata_snap operation. The 16th block will be
the shadow destination for the index block.
dmsetup create tmeta --table "0 128 linear /dev/sdc 0
128 3968 error"
2. Create a 16 MiB thin-pool
dmsetup create tdata --table "0 32768 zero"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/tmeta bs=4k count=1
dmsetup create tpool --table "0 32768 thin-pool /dev/mapper/tmeta \
/dev/mapper/tdata 128 0 1 skip_block_zeroing"
3. Reserve then release the metadata snapshot, to trigger metadata
commit failure and transaction abort. The held_root gets removed
from the on-disk superblock, causing inconsistent metadata.
dmsetup message tpool 0 "reserve_metadata_snap"
dmsetup message tpool 0 "release_metadata_snap"
thin_check v1.2.2 result:
Bad reference count for metadata block 6. Expected 1, but space map contains 2.
Bad reference count for metadata block 7. Expected 1, but space map contains 2.
1 metadata blocks have leaked.
Fix by deferring the held_root update to commit time.
Additionally, move the existing-snapshot check in __reserve_metadata_snap
before the shadow operation to avoid unnecessary work. In
__release_metadata_snap, clear pmd->held_root before btree deletion so
partial failure leaks blocks rather than leaving a stale reference, and
unlock the snapshot block before decrementing its refcount. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths
nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial
copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path
then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired.
This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually
reviewed against the current tree.
The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock
copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing
NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the
shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported:
WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at:
nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv]
but there are no more locks to release!
no locks held by exploit/193.
Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the
common unlock label for the post-lock paths only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds
check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881) |
| Uncontrolled recursion in the SVG parser and renderer of the Qt SVG module (QtSvg) in Qt Group Qt allows attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash via stack exhaustion) via a crafted SVG file with deeply nested elements. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()
[Why & How]
dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as
"capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can
silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to
return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on
subsequent vector appends.
Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal
overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue.
(cherry picked from commit 37668568641ccc4cc1dbca4923d0a16609dd5707) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Fix signed integer truncation in IPC receive
Fix potential buffer overflow where firmware-supplied data_size is cast
to signed int before being used in min_t(). Large unsigned values
(>= 0x80000000) become negative, causing unsigned wraparound and
oversized memcpy operations that can overflow the stack buffer.
Change min_t(int, ...) to min() as both values are unsigned and can be
handled by min() without explicit cast. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()
target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a
256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that
buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which
can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN
names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only
guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will
read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs
reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()
will be triggered.
Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length
check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the
target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so
resolve that here. |
| An uncontrolled recursion weakness in the BSON decoding logic of the MongoDB PHP driver may allow an unauthenticated party who can supply crafted binary document data to the decoder to exhaust the process stack. This may cause the PHP process using the driver to terminate unexpectedly, resulting in a loss of availability for that process. The condition occurs below the PHP layer and cannot be intercepted by application-level error handling. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix recvmsg() unconditional requeue
If rxrpc_recvmsg() fails because MSG_DONTWAIT was specified but the call at
the front of the recvmsg queue already has its mutex locked, it requeues
the call - whether or not the call is already queued. The call may be on
the queue because MSG_PEEK was also passed and so the call was not dequeued
or because the I/O thread requeued it.
The unconditional requeue may then corrupt the recvmsg queue, leading to
things like UAFs or refcount underruns.
Fix this by only requeuing the call if it isn't already on the queue - and
moving it to the front if it is already queued. If we don't queue it, we
have to put the ref we obtained by dequeuing it.
Also, MSG_PEEK doesn't dequeue the call so shouldn't call
rxrpc_notify_socket() for the call if we didn't use up all the data on the
queue, so fix that also. |
| Fleet before 4.89.0 contains an unbounded recursion vulnerability in Apple MDM enrollment property list parsing that allows unauthenticated attackers to crash the server. Attackers can send a crafted binary plist payload of about 150 bytes to the enrollment endpoints, triggering exponential allocation or infinite recursion that exhausts CPU and memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots
Program-allocated objects can own other local objects through referenced
kptrs. bpf_obj_free_fields() follows those pointers through
__bpf_obj_drop_impl() synchronously, before the object storage is freed
through RCU. A self-referential local kptr type therefore permits arbitrarily
deep object chains, and dropping the head can exhaust the kernel stack.
Long acyclic type chains have the same problem.
btf_check_and_fixup_fields() still assumes referenced kptrs only point to
kernel types and checks ownership through list and rbtree roots only. Its
existing rule is sufficient for graph-only cycles: the target of each graph
edge must contain a node, so every type in a cycle has both a root and a
node. The rule rejects such a type owning another root, breaking every
cycle. It also limits graph-only chains to three types, or two if the first
type contains a node, and conservatively rejects longer acyclic chains.
The missing local-kptr edges, rather than a missed graph-only cycle, are the
bug introduced by support for bpf_kptr_xchg() into local kptrs.
Replace that restriction with one bounded ownership walk covering graph
roots and local referenced kptrs. Run it after all BTF records have been
fixed up, reject cycles and paths deeper than eight record-bearing types,
and cache each type's suffix depth while checking it against the remaining
budget. This also permits the longer acyclic graph-only layouts rejected
by the old rule; update their existing BTF tests accordingly.
Keep the bound independent of MAX_CALL_FRAMES because recursive destruction
can run below a BPF call chain. A plain local pointee without special-field
metadata adds only a final non-recursing drop. Non-owning kptrs and
kernel-BTF kptrs do not recurse through local records and remain outside the
walk. Include local percpu-kptr edges too, although allocation of percpu
objects with special fields is currently forbidden, so that relaxing that
restriction cannot bypass the ownership bound.
btf_check_and_fixup_fields() continues to initialize graph_root.value_rec,
including for separately allocated map records. The ownership relationships
belong to immutable program BTF and only need validation at BTF load time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: fix swapped IPv6 IPsec policy masks
IPv6 XFRM policies may use different source and destination prefix
lengths. mlx5e_ipsec_policy_mask() builds the corresponding masks
independently, but setup_fte_addr6() installs each mask in the opposite
address field.
When the prefix lengths differ, this makes the source match use the
destination prefix and the destination match use the source prefix. The
resulting hardware rule can both miss traffic covered by the policy and
match traffic outside it.
Install each mask in its corresponding match field. |
