| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmveth: h_free logical LAN on open-fail after register
ibmveth_open() registers the logical LAN, then allocates the RX
buffer pools. A pool failure jumps to out_free_buffer_pools without
h_free_logical_lan(), so PHYP still owns the buffer-list page when
it is unmapped. request_irq() failure already issued the hypercall
before taking the same label.
Move that h_free to the shared post-register unwind so both paths
deregister before the buffer list is unmapped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: stop exception dump when nexthop group shrinks
Commit 4ce5dc9316de ("inet: switch inet_dump_fib() to RCU
protection") allowed IPv4 FIB dumps to run concurrently with nexthop
replacement.
fib_dump_info_fnhe() uses fib_info_num_path() as the loop bound,
then fib_info_nhc() independently reloads nh->nh_grp. If
RTM_NEWNEXTHOP replaces a group with fewer paths between those loads,
fib_info_nhc() returns NULL and the dump dereferences it through
nhc_flags.
Stop the walk when the indexed path is absent. Nexthop groups are
dense, so the current snapshot has no later path. |
| A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname verification allows a certificate without a matching IP address SAN to authenticate a connection to an IPv4 address when the host is written with non-ASCII characters, such as fullwidth digits (`１２７.0.0.1`).
`tls.checkServerIdentity()` did not recognize such hosts as IP addresses, even though they normalize and resolve to a regular IPv4 address, and matched them against the certificate DNS names and Common Name instead. A certificate containing `DNS:127.0.0.1` or `DNS:*.0.0.1` could therefore be accepted for an IP endpoint it was not issued for. This is a regression introduced after the fix for CVE-2026-48618.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x** and **24.x**. |
| Improper sanitization in the registration module allows reflected Cross-Site Scripting. |
| A flaw in Node.js TLS hostname verification allows a certificate with only a DNS SAN to authenticate an IP endpoint when the client connects using a non-canonical IPv4 spelling, such as `0177.0.0.1`, `0x7f.0.0.1`, `2130706433` or `127.1`.
`tls.checkServerIdentity()` did not classify these hosts as IP addresses, but normalized them to their canonical form and matched the result against the certificate DNS names. A certificate containing `DNS:127.0.0.1` and no `IP Address:127.0.0.1` SAN was therefore accepted, while the same certificate is correctly rejected for `127.0.0.1`. Exploitation requires a certificate with a numeric DNS SAN issued by a CA trusted by the client, and a platform resolver that accepts these spellings, such as glibc.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x**, **24.x**, and **22.x**. |
| A flaw in Node.js DNS resolution allows hostnames containing a NUL byte to be silently truncated by the dns.resolve*() functions and dns.reverse(). This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-48930, which only covered dns.lookup() and the net/tls host options.
Because the name is passed to c-ares as a C string, resolving attacker.example\0.trusted.example queries attacker.example and returns its records without any error. Applications that validate a hostname, for example against a domain allowlist, and then resolve it with dns.resolve*() can act on records for a different name than the one they validated.
This vulnerability affects Node.js 26.x, 24.x, and 22.x. |
| A flaw in Node.js HTTP Agent connection reuse can cause a client to accept as valid a response that was sent before the client has sent the request. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-48931.
The guard that destroys idle keep-alive sockets when unexpected data arrives only runs when the event loop polls for I/O. If an unsolicited response has already reached the socket but has not been read yet when the socket is handed to a new request, for example because the event loop was busy with synchronous work, the guard is removed without seeing it and the data is parsed as the response to the new request.
This vulnerability affects Node.js **26.x**, **24.x**, and **22.x**. |
| Stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Digest Authentication allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Use after free in Windows TCP/IP allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Untrusted pointer dereference in Windows Kernel allows an authorized attacker to deny service over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in DNS Server allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Remote Access Connection Manager allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Device Association Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Heap-based buffer overflow in Windows Volume Manager Extension Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Use after free in Windows Image Acquisition allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Print Spooler Components allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Use after free in Windows Bluetooth Port Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network. |
| Double free in Windows Hyper-V allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.
Consider two mount namespaces:
(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is
locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.
Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.
Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:
Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */
H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /*
Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */
Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */
So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount
is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a
lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked
to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is
unmounted again. |
