| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in ash-project ash allows an attacker to store a value of arbitrary size in an attribute whose length constraint should bound it.
Ash measures string length with Elixir's String.length/1, which counts Unicode graphemes, in the max_length and min_length constraints of Ash.Type.String (apply_constraints/2 in lib/ash/type/string.ex), in Ash.Resource.Validation.StringLength, and in the string_length expression function. A grapheme carries an unbounded number of combining marks, so a base character followed by a million combining acute accents is one grapheme and megabytes of data, and satisfies max_length: 2. Where the data layer imposes no independent limit (ETS, Mnesia, or a Postgres text column) the whole value is persisted, so an attacker can write an entire request body into an attribute declared with a small maximum and grow storage without bound.
The counting unit also disagrees with the storage layer, which counts codepoints rather than graphemes, so a value accepted by the constraint can still be rejected or truncated by the column. A Postgres varchar(n) column bounds the value itself and is not exposed.
This issue affects ash: from 0.10.0 before 3.33.0. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for provisioning an access key on the client's own account.
When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but does not check whether the envelope carries the optional key_authorization field. A client can attach a fully signed key authorization, provisioning a new access key with token spending limits on its own account, alongside the normal payment call. The key and each limit entry are persistent storage writes billed as intrinsic gas to the sponsor, bounded only by the gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of one key with three token limits the sponsored cost rises from about 46,587 gas to about 1,808,700 gas, and the client keeps a valid access key it paid nothing for.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to inflate the fee-payer's gas cost per sponsored payment by a large multiplier and to have the sponsor pay for EIP-7702 account delegations of the client's choosing.
When the server sponsors Tempo payments, MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy.measure/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex bounds the gas fields, the fee budget, the validity window and the access list of the client-signed 0x76 envelope, but never reads its aa_authorization_list field. Every signed delegation in that list is charged as intrinsic gas before the payment call runs, so a client attaching delegations from throwaway authority keys makes the sponsor pay for them within the default gas_limit ceiling. At the reporter's default of seven entries the sponsored cost rises from about 46,575 gas to about 1,884,087 gas. Because each entry is applied as a persistent set-code delegation, a client can also upgrade its own accounts to delegated code at the sponsor's expense.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.16.1. |
| A client may send a WebSocket frame with an unknown opcode and a very large declared payload length, causing Jetty to attempt a large memory allocation and potentially exhaust the JVM heap.
This occurs when auto-fragmentation is enabled, as unknown opcodes bypass the normal maximum frame size handling and payload allocation occurs before the opcode is validated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place
This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of
the associated data.
There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the
source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of
all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the
AD directly. |
| Net::IP::LPM version 1.10 for Perl does not properly consider leading zero characters in IP CIDR address strings, which could allow attackers to bypass access control that is based on IP addresses.
Leading zeros are used to indicate octal numbers, which can confuse users who are intentionally using octal notation, as well as users who believe they are using decimal notation. |
| YesWiki is a wiki system written in PHP. Prior to version 4.6.6, the recentchanges action (actions/recentchanges.php) accepts a period argument from two disjoint parameter spaces. A whitelist validates only the URL form against ['day','week','month']. The action-argument form takes the else branch with no validation, and the value flows into PageManager::getRecentlyChanged(), where it is interpolated into a WHERE time >= '...' ORDER BY time DESC clause without escaping or parameterization. UNION-based injection succeeds, the leaked rows render into the response page, so any visitor of the trigger page sees the exfiltrated data. The vulnerability provides arbitrary read of the YesWiki database to anyone who can save the trigger page. On a default install (default_write_acl='*'), this includes anonymous users, subject to the hashcash JS check on the page-edit form. Once the trigger page is saved, every subsequent view fires the injection as the SQLi is stored. Stored SQL injection is reachable through the page-edit flow, with arbitrary database read. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.6. |
| A maliciously crafted input, when processed by the Autodesk Installer IPC frame parser, may trigger improper validation of an input-specified position or offset, resulting in an out-of-range substring operation. A malicious actor may leverage this vulnerability to cause the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM service to terminate unexpectedly, resulting in a denial-of-service condition. |
| DeadLetterPublishingRecovererFactory reads the retry_topic-original-timestamp header from an inbound ConsumerRecord and passes its raw bytes directly to new BigInteger(header.value()) with no length or format validation.
Spring for Apache Kafka 4.1.0
Spring for Apache Kafka 4.0.0 - 4.0.6
Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.0 - 3.3.16
Spring for Apache Kafka 2.9.0 - 2.9.14
Spring for Apache Kafka 2.8.12 and earlier |
| fast-uri accepts a host that contains an unbalanced or misplaced authority bracket without reporting an error. A host that starts with an opening bracket but does not end with a closing bracket is neither validated as an IP literal nor canonicalized as a domain name, so parse() returns it as the host with error undefined, while Node's URL and the HTTP clients built on it resolve the same string to a different host. An application that reads the parsed host to make a host decision, such as an SSRF denylist, a redirect allowlist, or proxy routing, and then passes the original URL to an HTTP client evaluates its policy against a string that is not the host the request reaches. The same host is carried through normalize, equal, and resolve. This affects fast-uri versions 2.4.5, 3.1.6, and 4.1.3, and is fixed in 2.4.6, 3.1.7, and 4.1.4, where parse() reports a malformed host for any host that contains a bracket but is not a valid IPv6 literal. |
| pymonocypher uses cython to wrap the Monocypher C library. Prior to version 4.0.2.8, the argon2i_32 implementation does not check the nb_blocks size. If the caller does not provide a sufficiently large buffer based on the API contract, then argon2i_32 will write past the end of the buffer and possibly corrupt the heap. This issue has been patched in version 4.0.2.8. |
| jq is a command-line JSON processor. Prior to version 1.8.2, the _strindices builtin in jq's src/builtin.c passes its arguments directly to jv_string_indexes() without verifying they are strings, and jv_string_indexes() in src/jv.c relies solely on assert() checks that are stripped in release builds compiled with -DNDEBUG. This allows an attacker to crash jq trivially with input like _strindices(0), and by crafting a numeric value whose IEEE-754 bit pattern maps to a chosen pointer, achieve a controlled pointer dereference and limited memory read/probe primitive. Any deployment that evaluates untrusted jq filters against a release build is vulnerable. This issue has been patched in commit fdf8ef0f0810e3d365cdd5160de43db46f57ed03, which is part of version 1.8.2. |
| node-forge through 1.4.0 fails to validate element count in nested DigestAlgorithm sequences during RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature verification. Attackers can embed garbage bytes inside the DigestAlgorithm sequence to forge valid signatures for arbitrary messages using low-exponent RSA keys. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33894. |
| There is an out of bounds write vulnerability due to improper bounds checking resulting in a large destination address when parsing a DSB file with Digilent DASYLab. This vulnerability may result in arbitrary code execution. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to get a user to open a specially crafted DSB file. The vulnerability affects all versions of DASYLab. |
| async-tar is a tar archive reading/writing library for async Rust. Prior to version 0.6.1, async-tar mis-applies a buffered PAX size extension to an intermediary extension header (a GNU longname L, a GNU longlink K, or a PAX x/g header) instead of to the next file entry. POSIX requires a PAX extended-header record set to describe the next file entry, never an intervening extension header. Because poll_next_raw (src/archive.rs) threads the buffered PAX records into the size computation of whatever raw header it reads next — and that header can be an intermediary L — the stream cursor is advanced by an attacker-chosen amount when the L body is consumed. The parser then desyncs relative to a POSIX-correct tar parser (e.g. GNU tar), reading subsequent bytes at the wrong block boundary. This issue has been patched in version 0.6.1. |
| Tornado is a Python web framework and asynchronous networking library. Prior to 6.5.8, Tornado parses application/x-www-form-urlencoded request bodies with urllib.parse.parse_qs in tornado/escape.py without passing max_num_fields. RequestHandler._execute in tornado/web.py parses the body before handler dispatch through HTTPServerRequest._parse_body and parse_body_arguments in tornado/httputil.py, so an unauthenticated request body containing millions of separator-delimited fields can synchronously stall the single-threaded event loop and delay every connection. The body is bounded only by max_buffer_size, which defaults to 104857600 bytes. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.8. |
| fast-uri before 4.1.2, 3.1.5, and 2.4.4 requires a literal double forward slash to recognize a URI authority, so a reference that uses a backslash based introducer in place of it (backslash backslash, forward slash backslash, or backslash forward slash) is parsed with no authority and folds into the path. Node's native WHATWG URL parser instead treats a backslash as interchangeable with a forward slash for special schemes, so the two parsers extract different hosts from the same input. Applications that use fast-uri to enforce host based policy such as allowlists, SSRF filtering, or redirect validation before passing the same URL into Node's URL or fetch consumers can be steered to an unintended host. Upgrade to fast-uri 4.1.2, 3.1.5, or 2.4.4. |
| Date::Manip versions through 7.00 for Perl return corrupted dates via non-ASCII decimal digits that pass the numeric range tests in check.
The parse regexes capture year, month and day with the `\d` shorthand, which on a character string matches the whole Unicode decimal digit property `\p{Nd}` and not just `[0-9]`. Date::Manip::Base::check then validates the captured fields with numeric comparisons alone (`$y<1 || $y>9999`, `$m<1 || $m>12`, `$d<1 || $d>$days`), and _parse_check stores the numified fields (`$y+0`). Perl truncates a string at the first character that is not an ASCII digit, so a field whose leading characters are ASCII digits numifies to an in-range prefix and satisfies every test: a year field of three ASCII digits followed by U+0664 ARABIC-INDIC DIGIT FOUR numifies to 202, giving the year 0202, and one non-ASCII digit in the month or day field shifts those fields the same way. The hour, minute and second fields match explicit ASCII character classes (`0?[0-9]`, `[0-5][0-9]`) and do not shift, though a non-ASCII digit in a fractional hour or minute field truncates the fraction.
Any caller that passes an untrusted character string to ParseDate() or Date::Manip::Date->parse() can get back a date that differs from the string it parsed, with no parse error. Where the parsed date gates logic such as an expiry check or a retention window, the shift goes unnoticed. |
| ServiceNow has remediated a sandbox escape security issue that was identified in the ServiceNow AI Platform. This security issue could allow an unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code within the ServiceNow AI Platform, potentially leading to more access to the ServiceNow AI Platform than intended.
ServiceNow deployed a security update to hosted instances and ServiceNow provided the update to our partners and self-hosted customers. We are not currently aware of malicious exploitation against ServiceNow instances.
We recommend customers promptly apply appropriate updates or upgrade to a patched release if they have not already done so. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input vulnerability in Erlang/OTP eldap allows a malicious or compromised LDAP server to degrade availability by returning a referral URL whose port component is a very long run of digits.
eldap:parse_port/2 passes the port substring straight to list_to_integer/1 with no length bound. The surrounding try ... catch only rejects a value that fails to parse, so a syntactically valid port of up to roughly 1.26 million digits converts successfully and costs the caller hundreds of milliseconds of arbitrary-precision arithmetic per referral. The conversion function itself is documented to accept integers of any size, so bounding the input is the caller's responsibility. Reaching the flaw requires the application to pass a server-supplied referral to eldap:parse_ldap_url/1, which eldap never calls itself: referral strings are returned to the caller unparsed.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.17, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.6, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.6, corresponding to eldap from 1.0.3 before 1.2.14.2, from 1.2.15 before 1.2.16.1, and from 1.3 before 1.3.1. |
