| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle JavaFX product of Oracle Java SE (component: JavaFX). Supported versions that are affected are Oracle JavaFX: 25.0.4 and 27. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise Oracle JavaFX. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized read access to a subset of Oracle JavaFX accessible data. Note: This vulnerability applies to Java deployments, typically in clients running sandboxed Java Web Start applications or sandboxed Java applets, that load and run untrusted code (e.g., code that comes from the internet) and rely on the Java sandbox for security. This vulnerability does not apply to Java deployments, typically in servers, that load and run only trusted code (e.g., code installed by an administrator). CVSS 3.1 Base Score 3.1 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N). |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle BI Publisher product of Oracle Analytics (component: BI Platform Security). Supported versions that are affected are 8.2.0.0.0, 12.2.1.4.0 and 26.01.0.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle BI Publisher. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle BI Publisher. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). |
| Vulnerability in the Oracle Communications Billing and Revenue Management product of Oracle Communications (component: BRM Server). Supported versions that are affected are 15.0.0.0.0, 15.0.1.0.0, 15.1.0.0.0 and 15.2.0.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where Oracle Communications Billing and Revenue Management executes to compromise Oracle Communications Billing and Revenue Management. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Communications Billing and Revenue Management accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.5 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kprobes: Skip disarmed probes when checking optkprobe overlap
On x86, an optkprobe at A replaces five bytes with a jump. If a disabled
probe B is at A+2, get_optimized_kprobe() stops at B when arming a new
probe C at A+4. It leaves A optimized:
A A+1 A+2 A+3 A+4
A's jump | e9 | d0 | d1 | d2 | d3 |
after C | e9 | d0 | d1 | d2 | cc |
The INT3 for C overwrites the last byte of A's jump displacement, so
execution can jump to the wrong address. B can have prepared optinsns
while disarmed, but has no jump to unoptimize.
Continue past disarmed and unprepared probes to find the active optimized
probe before arming a probe in its jump. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: filter some flags received in the backup server
While the IPVS SYNC protocol is not secure by design
we can still protect the backup server from messages that
can wreak havoc.
This commit addresses problems from received connection flags
or their combinations. We now drop messages as follows:
1. the NO_CPORT+TEMPLATE combination allows lookups for normal
connections to hit template which can break in many ways.
While the master does not sync connections with NO_CPORT flag,
i.e. before they are established, we still accept NO_CPORT
without TEMPLATE.
2. ONE_PACKET: it is not sent by master, so we do not
expect it in backup. Before now it was ignored by
IP_VS_CONN_F_BACKUP_MASK for protocol v1 while protocol
v0 created connections that are not hashed and dropped
immediately. Better to apply the IP_VS_CONN_F_BACKUP_MASK
also to the flags from v0 messages for consistency with v1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: bpf: reject invalid NAT manipulation types
As bpf_ct_set_nat_info() is not validating the NAT manipulation type a
wrong value can be passed directly to nf_nat_setup_info(). This triggers
the WARN_ON() at nf_nat_setup_info() and if panic_on_warn isn't set,
then IPS_SRC_NAT_DONE is set without adding nat_bysource and conntrack
cleanup tries to unlink an uninitialized hlist node.
Fix this by checking that NAT manipulation type is correct before
calling nf_nat_setup_info(). In addition, if the WARN_ON is hit, return
NF_DROP instead of continuing with the processing to avoid similar
situations in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: storage: sierra_ms: reject short SWoC info transfers
sierra_get_swoc_info() requests sizeof(struct swoc_info) (60) bytes
from the device via usb_control_msg(), but its callers only treat a
negative return value as failure. A device that answers the
vendor-specific GetSwocInfo request with a short IN transfer is
therefore accepted, leaving the tail of the freshly allocated
(kmalloc(), non-zeroing) swoc_info buffer uninitialized.
truinst_show() subsequently prints swocInfo->rev, swocInfo->LinuxSKU
and swocInfo->LinuxVer from that buffer into the world-readable
(0444) "truinst" sysfs attribute. An emulated/malicious USB device
(VID 0x1199, PID 0x0fff) can exploit this to disclose up to 5 bytes
of stale kernel heap memory (kmalloc-64) to unprivileged userspace,
once per sysfs read, indefinitely. On kernels built without
init_on_alloc this leaks recently freed heap contents.
Only accept the transfer when the full structure was received.
sierra_ms_init() already retries failed queries, so well-behaved
devices are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tipd: fix uninitialized typec_partner_desc in tps6598x_connect()
tps6598x_connect() passes a stack-allocated typec_partner_desc to
typec_register_partner() after initializing only usb_pd, accessory and
identity.
typec_register_partner() copies attach and deattach from the descriptor
into the partner. With those fields left unset, garbage function pointers
may be stored and later invoked from typec_partner_link_device() when a USB
device is linked to the port. Uninitialized pd_revision and usb_capability
similarly leak stack data through partner sysfs.
Zero-initialize the descriptor so optional callbacks remain NULL and the
remaining fields are zero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tty: vcc: zero-initialize control packet in vcc_send_ctl()
The stack-allocated struct vio_vcc pkt was partially initialized,
leaving the tag.stype_env field uninitialized before being sent via
ldc_write(), potentially leaking kernel stack data to the LDC peer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-multipath: fix underflow in ANA log bounds checks
The number of ANA groups advertised through Identify Controller sizes the
ANA log buffer. The ANA log header and group descriptors independently
supply the number of groups and namespace IDs to parse.
Both bounds checks subtract an untrusted object size from ana_log_size
before comparing the current offset. If the object is larger than the
buffer, the size_t subtraction underflows and lets the parser read beyond
ana_log_buf.
Check the current offset before the first subtraction and compare each
object size with the remaining buffer instead. This rejects inconsistent
ANA data before dereferencing a truncated group descriptor or walking an
oversized namespace ID array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cw1200: fix TX padding OOB read leaking heap data to device
The TX path rounds the transfer size up to the bus alignment
(align_size(), up to 511 bytes for SDIO, 1 byte for SPI) but sends
the padded length straight from the frame buffer, which has no room
reserved for the padding. cw1200_data_write() therefore reads past
the end of the frame and the bus transfer carries those bytes to the
device. A bogus device can collect up to 511 bytes of kernel heap
data per TX frame.
The RX path does not have this problem: it allocates the skb with
the aligned length (alloc_len) before reading.
Compute the exact padding with the bus align_size() callback, make
sure queued TX frames have tailroom for it, and zero the padding
bytes before the transfer so nothing past the frame is exposed.
This is not expected to change driver behavior on most cases: frame
contents and transfer sizes are unchanged, only the content of the
padding bytes (previously undefined stale memory, now zero), which
the device never reads since the WSM header carries the real frame
length. The skb expansion can only fail under memory exhaustion,
in which case the frame is dropped like on the existing error paths
of cw1200_tx().
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: Dont send random pad bytes in RESET/ACTIVATE messages
The interface name is passed in a fixed length (TIPC_MAX_IF_NAME) buffer.
Replace the strcpy(data, l->if_name) with memcpy() so that the
pad bytes are actually written (l->if_name[] is zero padded)
rather than sending random bytes from the skb to the remote system.
Replace two other strcpy() with strscpy(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix SMI event cross-process information leak
kfd_smi_ev_enabled() skips the suser privilege check when pid=0.
PROCESS_START, PROCESS_END, and VMFAULT events are emitted with
pid=0 while carrying another process's PID and command name, so any
/dev/kfd user in the render group can monitor all GPU workloads.
Pass the target process PID into kfd_smi_event_add() for these events
so the existing per-client filter restricts delivery to the owning
process or CAP_SYS_ADMIN subscribers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate TX_CMD response layout
TX_CMD parsing uses frame_count to walk status entries and then
read the trailing SCD SSN. Make the minimum-length check follow
that exact runtime layout calculation before parsing the payload.
For new TX API, reject TX_CMD responses with frame_count != 1 and
warn/return in the aggregation handler to document that aggregated
accounting is expected via BA notifications. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memcg: make the v1 soft limit knob inert
The v1 soft limit has been deprecated since v6.12 and nobody has reported
depending on it. Start the removal by decoupling the interface from the
implementation: keep memory.soft_limit_in_bytes, but ignore writes to it
and always report the maximum value on read similar to what
memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes already does.
Writes are still parsed, so malformed input keeps returning -EINVAL. The
knob now also behaves the same everywhere: it used to return -EOPNOTSUPP
on PREEMPT_RT, where soft limit reclaim has always been disabled.
This also fixes the syzbot report linked below. Soft limit reclaim is the
only caller that runs shrink_lruvec() from kswapd against a specific
memcg, so it is the only way to reach lru_gen_shrink_lruvec() and in turn
set_mm_walk(), which warns when called from kswapd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Do not treat master device as a duplicate target
i3c_master_search_i3c_dev_duplicate() searches the bus for another I3C
device with the same PID as the reference device. The search can match
master->this, causing the controller itself to be returned as a
duplicate.
Since the controller is not a target device, it cannot be a duplicate of
one. Exclude master->this from matching so that the function only
returns real duplicate target devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
time/namespace: Validate nanosecond field in proc_timens_set_offset()
The function validates tv_sec to be within [-KTIME_SEC_MAX, KTIME_SEC_MAX]
but never validates that tv_nsec is within the valid range of
[0, NSEC_PER_SEC-1] before using it in timespec64_add().
timespec64_add() expects both timespec64 structures to have normalized
values with tv_nsec in the range [0, 999999999]. If off->val.tv_nsec
contains invalid values (negative or >= NSEC_PER_SEC), it could lead to
incorrect calculations or unexpected behavior.
Add validation to ensure tv_nsec is within the valid range before
performing the addition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Zero queue and stack outputs on lock failure
Queue and stack pop/peek helpers accept an uninitialized output buffer
because the verifier expects the helper to initialize it. The empty-map
error path clears the buffer, but a failed lock acquisition returns
-EBUSY without writing it.
Clear the output before returning -EBUSY so BPF programs cannot observe
uninitialized stack contents after a failed helper call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: ptrace: Keep 'orig_x0' in-sync with x0 on syscall entry
Commit e057b9477232 ("arm64: syscall: Ensure saved x0 is kept in-sync
with tracer updates") attempted to resolve a long-standing issue with
syscall entry tracing, where a tracer is able to manipulate the first
syscall argument without being subjected to seccomp or audit checking.
Unfortunately, that fix was incomplete [1], as it failed to update
'orig_x0' between a tracer updating x0 during a seccomp ptrace exit
(SECCOMP_RET_TRACE) and the seccomp filter being re-evaluated.
Rather than add hooks to the core seccomp code, instead move the
synchronisation code into the ptrace GPR and syscall setting code so
that 'orig_x0' is kept up to date with x0 whenever we're stopped on the
syscall entry path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: steam: Reject short reads
Steam Controller FEATURE reports encode the size of the message in the
message itself. Previously we were trusting that the size reported matched
the size we actually read, leading to a potential issue with short reads.
Instead, we should actually verify the length of the read. |
